# Publishing in Philosophy

Rodrigo Díaz

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### Publishing in Philosophy

- Why?
- When?
- What?
  - Article types
  - Article structure
  - Choosing the journal
- How?
  - The writing process
  - The The peer-review process
- Where?
- Who?



# Why publish?

### Why publish?

- To advance knowledge in the discipline.
  - Knowledge is cumulative, we build upon previous work.
- To "survive" in academia, if you want a career in it.\*
  - How much and where you publish will be used as a heuristic to measure your research skills.

### \* Alt-Ac Job-Market Tips (quick links)

Here is a list of links to our Alt-Ac Transition Tips series:

- 1. Supporting non-academic careers (Kevin J.S. Zollman)
- 2. Moving from academia to a think tank (Jason Schukraft)
- 3. What I learned from leaving academic philosophy (Samuel Kampa)
- 4. My Path into Project Management (Katharine Schweitzer)
- 5. Tips for transitioning into tech industries?
- 6. Leaving academia for industry: 7 years later (Zachary Ernst)
- 7. Networking and 'Leaving Academia'
- Interview: 'How to Shawshank your way out of academia' (Aaron Kagan)
- 9. How to leave philosophy (Greg Stoutenburg)
- How to make yourself hireable outside of academia as a philosophy grad student or PhD (Aaron Kagan)
- 11. Alt-ac careers podcast: 'Off Campus'
- 12. Crowdsourcing job ads thread

# When to publish?

### When to publish?

- It's never too early!
- E.g. Master's theses can be publishable if written or edited with this goal in mind (see "How to publish").



# What to publish?

Article Types

- Original articles
  - Novel argument / contribution.
- Discussion articles
- Encyclopedia entries
- Book reviews

#### There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes

Barry Maguire M

Mind, Volume 127, Issue 507, July 2018, Pages 779-805, https://doi.org/10.1093

/mind/fzx011

Published: 01 August 2017

Permissions

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#### **Abstract**

A dogma of contemporary ethical theory maintains that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is the very same as the nature of normative support for actions. The prevailing view is that normative reasons provide the support across the board. I argue that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is importantly different from the nature of normative support for actions. Actions are indeed supported by reasons. Reasons are gradable and contributory. The support relations for affective attitudes are neither. So-called reasons of the right kind for affective attitudes are facts that make those very attitudes fitting. Unlike reasons, fit-making facts for affective attitudes do not conflict with each other or combine in the explanation of further normative facts. More fit-making facts just make a more complex set of reactions fitting. This result undermines various analyses and unity these sin the philosophy of normativity.

- Original articles
- Discussion articles
  - Critically assess one paper.
- Encyclopedia entries
- Book reviews

### We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes

David Faraci

Mind, Volume 129, Issue 513, January 2020, Pages 225–234, https://doi.org/10.1093

/mind/fzy054

Published: 25 October 2018

66 Cite 🔑 Permissions < Share 🔻

#### **Abstract**

Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. 'There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to' this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by differences between actions and affective attitudes, not between kinds of normative support. In closing, I argue that even if Maguire were correct, the extent of the threat to one of his central targets—so-called 'buck-passing' views—would remain unclear.

- Original articles
- Discussion articles
- Encyclopedia entries
  - Review previous work on a topic.
- Book reviews



Experimental philosophy and the method of cases

Joachim Horvath X, Steffen Koch

SUBMISSIONS

VOLUNTEER

STAY CONNECTED

First published: 05 November 2020 | https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12716 | Citations: 5



J. L. Austin was one of the more influential British philosophers of his time, due to his rigorous thought, extraordinary personality, and innovative philosophical method. According to John Searle, he was both passionately loved and hated by his contemporaries. Like Socrates, he seemed to destroy all philosophical orthodoxy without presenting an alternative,

- Original articles
- Discussion articles
- Encyclopedia entries
- Book reviews
  - Summarize and comment a book.

## Economic Statecraft: Human Rights, Sanctions, and Conditionality, by Cécile Fabre

Economic Statecraft: Human Rights, Sanctions, and Conditionality, by Cécile Fabre.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 201. Pp. 214.

Christian Barry M

Mind, fzab075, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab075

Published: 20 November 2021


66 Cite 
▶ Permissions 
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**Issue Section:** Book Review

States and other collective agents exercise influence in the international arena in a range of ways. One is by using military force or by threating its use. That topic has been the subject of a great deal of philosophical debate over the past few decades.

More frequently, however, influence is exercised in other ways, for example through the use of economic sanctions or by conditions that are attached to offers of material halp or debt relief. These means of exercising influence, which Cécile Eabre refers to

- Original articles
- Discussion articles / Encyclopedia entries
- Book reviews



Check the "Instructions for Authors" section in journals' websites for more information (accepted article types, wordcount, etc.)



#### Preparing your paper

#### Word limits

Please include a word count for your paper (including abstract, notes, and references).

A typical Original Article for this journal should be no more than 8000 words.

The maximum length for a Discussion Note for this journal is 3000 words.

The maximum length for a Critical Notice for this journal is 5000 words.

The maximum length for a Book Review for this journal is 1800 words.

The maximum length for a Book Note for this journal is 400 words.

# What to publish?

Article Structure

#### Abstract

### Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy

HEIDI L. MAIBOM

General background

Specific background

Knowledge gap

Here we show...

Results

**Implications** 

Abstract: Psychopaths are renowned for their immoral behavior. They are ideal candidates for testing the empirical plausibility of moral theories. Many think the source of their immorality is their emotional deficits. Psychopaths experience no guilt or remorse, feel no empathy, and appear to be perfectly rational. If this is true, sentimentalism is supported over rationalism. Here, I examine the nature of psychopathic practical reason and argue that it is impaired. The relevance to morality is discussed. I conclude that rationalists can explain the moral deficits of psychopaths as well as sentimentalists. In the process, I identify psychological structures that underpin practical rationality.

### Abstract

#### Introduction

• Background & goals.

Psychopathic individuals are perhaps best known for their flagrant disregard for social and moral norms. [...]

. . .

Given their peculiar profile, psychopaths are of particular interest to moral philosophy. At first blush, it appears that they refuse to adopt social and moral norms, not because they are mad. but because they are not swaved by the emotions that influence us. [...]

\*Ideally, one could be able to understand your paper just by reading the first (two) sentence(s) of each paragraph.

The question remains whether psychopathy provides support of sentimentalism as an empirical theory over competing ethical theories. [...]

I will argue that although psychopathy supports sentimentalism it does not speak against rationalism. [...]

# Abstract **Introduction**

- Background & goals.
- Outline

The paper is organized as follows. First, I introduce constraints on practical reason that are relatively uncontroversial and bear a close relation to moral judgment. For this I lean on Onora O'Neill's (1998) interpretation of Kant's ethical project. Second, I examine the cognitive shortcomings of psychopaths and link them to shortcomings in practical reason. I show that psychopaths are not irrational only when they are also immoral. They have more general rational deficits. Third, I show how the deficits found in psychopaths' practical reason impact their moral capacities. In section 4 and 5, I address objections to my position. I argue against the suggestion that humans with undeveloped reason nevertheless are morally competent, that psychopaths' deficits can't be rational because they are untreatable, and that that their practical reasoning deficits cannot be explained in terms of an underlying emotional deficit (cf. Damasio, 1994). Finally, I outline some psychological mechanisms that underpin practical rationality.

### Abstract

#### Introduction

- Background & goals.
- Outline

Background

Argument(s)

Objection(s)

Conclusion(s)

The paper is organized as follows First, I introduce constraints on practical reason that are relatively uncontroversial and bear a close relation to moral judgment. For this I lean on Onora O'Neill's (1998) interpretation of Kant's ethical project. Second, I examine the cognitive shortcomings of psychopaths and link them to shortcomings in practical reason. I show that psychopaths are not irrational only when they are also immoral. They have more general rational deficits Third, I show how the deficits found in psychopaths' practical reason impact their moral capacities. In section 4 and 5, 1 address objections to my position. I argue against the suggestion that humans with undeveloped reason nevertheless are morally competent, that psychopaths' deficits can't be rational because they are untreatable, and that that their practical reasoning deficits cannot be explained in terms of an underlying emotional deficit (cf. Damasio, 1994). Finally, outline some psychological mechanisms that underpin practical rationality.

#### Abstract

#### Introduction

- Background & goals.
- Outline
  - You don't need it before starting to write!

#### **Reverse Outlining as a Revision Tool**

Bernhard Nickel · Harvard Philosophy Version of Fall 2016

#### 1 What is reverse outlining, and why should you do it?

Reverse outlining is a part of the revision process that many students and working philosophers have found very helpful. As with all remarks about the writing process, I give these remarks fully cognizant of the fact that many people have different working processes and styles, so this may, in the end, not work for you. But I strongly encourage you to try it a few times so that you can see if it works for you, and do give it more than one try.

• Reference sections are much easier to build using reference managers, e.g.:





# How to publish?

The writing process

- What counts
  - Knowledge of the literature
  - Clarity
  - Originality of contribution
  - Quality of the argument and responses to objections

- What counts
  - Knowledge of the literature
  - Clarity

  - References found in this work • Originality of contribution
  - Quality of the argument and responses to objections



- What counts
  - Knowledge of the literature
  - Clarity
  - Originality of contribution
  - Quality of the argument and responses to objections
- Iterative & social
  - Informal discussions
  - Oral presentations at seminars and conferences
  - Written feedback on early drafts



#### Conferences



may be either colloquium papers (maximum 3000 words, exclusive of footnotes and bibliography) or symposium papers (maximum 5000 words, exclusive of footnotes and bibliography).

https://www.apaonline.org/page/papersubmission



Présentation de votre communication (max 1000 mots)

https://laspq.org/congres



- a) Submit a **completed paper** of **no more than 3000 words**. Papers exceeding this word count will not be considered. Word count does not include the bibliography, notes or abstract. Submitted papers must include an abstract of **no more than 50 words**. Accepted papers will be scheduled for hour-long sessions (30-35 minutes for presentation followed by a discussion period).
- b) Submit an **abstract** of **no more than 500 words** excluding bibliography). Accepted abstracts will be scheduled for half-hour sessions (20 minutes for presentation followed by a discussion period). Abstracts are not eligible for essay prizes.

#### Conferences



may be either colloquium papers (maximum 3000 words, exclusive of footnotes and bibliography) or symposium papers (maximum 5000 words, exclusive of footnotes and bibliography).

https://www.apaonline.org/page/papersubmission



https://laspq.org/congres



https://www.acpcpa.ca/cpages/submit

More on:



Présentation de votre communication (max 1000 mots)

- a) Submit a **completed paper** of **no more than 3000 words**. Papers exceeding this word count will not be considered. Word count does not include the bibliography, notes or abstract. Submitted papers must include an abstract of **no more than 50 words**. Accepted papers will be scheduled for hour-long sessions (30-35 minutes for presentation followed by a discussion period).
- b) Submit an **abstract** of **no more than 500 words** excluding bibliography). Accepted abstracts will be scheduled for half-hour sessions (20 minutes for presentation followed by a discussion period). Abstracts are not eligible for essay prizes.

https://philevents.org/

https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/philosophy/philos-l/



Centre de communication écrite





Direction des services aux étudiants

Centre d'aide aux étudiants



http://www.cce.umontreal.ca/caf.htm https://www.aide.ulaval.ca/ https://www.mcgill.ca/mwc/
https://vie-etudiante.uqam.ca/

# How to publish?

The peer-review process

Submission



Submission



#### **Rodrigo Diaz**

April 8, 2020 at 05:22

Submission to Journal of Consciousness Studies

To: graham@imprint.co.uk



Dear Graham Horswell,

Please find attached my manuscript for consideration for publication in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. The manuscript is anonymized. I also attach a Title Page including author information and acknowledgements, as well as my Curriculum Vitae.

Cover letter

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Rodrigo







Meta-

Meta-

Diaz\_CV.pdf

- Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers

- Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers

Dear Dr. Rodrigo Díaz,

The editors have given careful consideration to your manuscript "Do moral beliefs motivate action?" and, I'm sorry to say, have decided not to accept it for publication in the Philosophical Review.

We realize that it's unsatisfying to receive only a report of the decision, without any of the underlying rationale. However, the majority of manuscripts submitted to the Philosophical Review are rejected without comments. The editors do the initial reviewing, and due to their workload the editors only provide comments on very few of the manuscripts rejected at this stage. We hope you'll understand and excuse this limitation. Additionally, we now allow referees the option of summary rejection, and some papers we reject without comments have been seen by a referee first.

- Submission\*
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers



- Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers
- Peer-review

Dear PhD Diaz,


In view of your expertise, Wiebe van der Hoek has recommended you as a reviewer for the following manuscript which has been submitted to Synthese.

In order to keep delays to a minimum, we would appreciate if you could please accept or decline this invitation within a week, or at the latest, two weeks.

If you accept, we would appreciate receiving your report within 42 days; of course, a shorter period would be helpful for the authors.

- Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers
- Peer-review
- Editors' Decision
  - Accept
  - Reject
  - Revise & Resubmit

- Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers
- Peer-review
- Editors' Decision
  - Accept
  - Reject
  - Revise & Resubmit



- Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers
- Peer-review
- Editors' Decision
  - Accept
  - Reject
  - Revise & Resubmit

Dear Dr Rodrigo Diaz,

I am writing to you in regard to manuscript number RAJP-2022-0271 entitled 'Do moral beliefs motivate action?', which you submitted to the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

I'm sorry to tell you that, having taken into account the advice of our referee(s) and/or associate editors, we cannot find room for it in our limited number of pages. We will not consider a revision.

- Submission\*
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers
- Peer-review
- Editors' Decision
  - Accept
  - Reject
  - Revise & Resubmit



- Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers
- Peer-review
- Editors' Decision
  - Accept
  - Reject
  - Revise & Resubmit

Dear Dr Diaz,

Thank you for submitting your paper, "Do moral beliefs motivate action?," to Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

We have now received the reviewers' reports on your paper and, although we cannot accept this version for publication in our journal, we would be happy to consider a revised version if you think you can respond to the concerns of our outside reviewers.

While the revisions are labelled as "minor," please make sure you consider all points raised by our reviewers. We also ask you to include a note of the changes made in response to their suggestions. If you think either of the reviewers has misunderstood any aspects of your paper, it is important to explain this in your note and to be careful, in revising, to ensure that other readers will not face similar difficulties understanding your paper.

- Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers
- Peer-review
- Editors' Decision
  - Accept
  - Reject
  - Revise & Resubmit
    - Response to Reviewers

(Small point, here, but Gottlieb's name is misspelled in the manuscript: should be "Gottlieb" not "Gotlieb".)

Thank you. This has now been corrected.

(Further, there is a related literature on the dimensions of mind perception that is relevant to this question and should probably be mentioned in a bit more detail. The author notes one study in this area -- Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007) -- in Footnote 2, although it is unclear that this is best described as work on "attributions of consciousness to different entities". But there is also more recent work from Weisman et al. 2017 and Malle 2019. These studies suggest that prototypical examples of phenomenal states fall across different dimensions of mind perception, including feeling pain and seeing colors.)


Thank you for these further comments and references. Gray, Gray and Wegner (2007) is now cited in the main text along with other studies investigating attributions of conscious mental states (p. 4). Gray, Gray and Wegner's work, as well as Weisman et al. (2017) and Malle (2019) is definitely interesting and important. However contrary to what happens with Systma and Machery's studies, this work does not seem to directly concern questions regarding the prevalence of problem intuitions. For this reason, his work is not discussed in the text.

- Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers
- Peer-review
- Editors' Decision
  - Accept
  - Reject
  - Revise & Resubmit
    - Response to Reviewers
    - Revised Manuscript

(2019) have pointed out, participants' mean agreement with whether science could fully explain conscious phenomena was above the neutral midpoint for the vast majority of items. That is, most participants agreed with the claim that science would be able to fully explain conscious experiences at some point. Thus, it is controversial whether Gotlieb and Lombrozo's results show that epistemic problem intuitions are widespread.

Although Gottlieb and Lombrozo's is the only study to date testing core problem intuitions, other studies have tested non-core problem intuitions regarding color inversion cases (whether others can experience color different than us) or the possibility of "zombies" - human duplicates without conscious experience - (Fischer and Sytsma, ms; Sytsma, 2010; Peressini, 2014). Furthermore, there is a wealth of research investigating people's attributions of conscious mental states (Robbins and Jack, 2006; Gray, Gray and Wegner, 2007; Knobe and Prinz, 2008; Sytsma and Machery, 2009; Arico, 2010; Phelan, Arico and Nichols, 2013; Buckwalter and Phelan, 2014; see Sytsma, 2016, for a review). Of special relevance for our purposes here are

- (Re)Submission
- Editors' Decision
  - Reject
  - Send to reviewers
- Peer-review
- Editors' Decision
  - Accept
  - Reject
  - Revise & Resubmit
    - Response to Reviewers
    - Revised Manuscript



# Where to publish?

Choosing the journal


### Beware of predatory journals!

- Emails inviting your submissions can look (more or less) legit
- But proper journals rarely or never invite submissions this way
- Google search "["name of the journal"] predatory"



#### Respected Author,

We are pleased to inform you that IJAHSS is going to release its upcoming issue (Volume 03, Issue 06 Nov-Dec 2021), With a minimum publication charge. We would like to invite you to contribute a Research Paper for publication in IJAHSS. Papers published in IJAHSS will receive very high publicity and acquire a very high reputation. We publish original research articles, case studies, review articles and short communication.





Dear Dr. Díaz,

Due to your involvement in the field and the research you published in your paper, "Reactance, morality, and disgust: the relationship between affective dispositions and compliance with official health recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic," IntechOpen invites you to contribute a chapter to "New Insights Into Emotional Intelligence," an Open Access book edited by Dr. Martha Peaslee Levine.

Work with an internationally recognized peer group and gain increased visibility for your published work.

Please visit the book project page to start the submission process at:

https://publish.intechopen.com/s/chapter-registration?bookId=11300&call=rodrigo.diaz@philo.unibe.ch

公

### • Fit References

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- Fit
- Prestige

\*SRJ Impact factor: Measures the average number of citations per article in that journal.

	Title	Туре	↓ SJR	H index	Total Docs. (2020)	Total Docs. (3years)	Total Refs. (2020)	Total Cites (3years)
1	Philosophical Review, The	journal	3.371 Q1	57	8	28	668	91
2	Nous	journal	2.574 Q1	66	70	138	3591	413
3	Mind	journal	2.494 Q1	53	27	100	1204	200
4	Political Psychology	journal	2.419 Q1	95	86	239	5990	1165
5	Journal of Philosophy	journal	1.927 Q1	50	4	75	157	157

- Fit
- Prestige
- 1. Philosophical Review (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices)
- 2. Mind loses to Philosophical Review by 371-165
- 3. Nous loses to Philosophical Review by 386-153, loses to Mind by 272-256
- 4. Journal of Philosophy loses to Philosophical Review by 397-133, loses to Nous by 326-206
- 5. **Philosophy & Phenomenological Research** loses to Philosophical Review by 420-121, loses to Journal of Philosophy by 303-231
- 6. **Australasian Journal of Philosophy** loses to Philosophical Review by 466-82, loses to Philosophy & Phenomenological Research by 433-115
- 7. **Philosopher's Imprint** loses to Philosophical Review by 462-77, loses to Australasian Journal of Philosophy by 299-227
- 8. **Philosophical Studies** loses to Philosophical Review by 476-72, loses to Philosopher's Imprint by 282-245


\*Scores reflect the judgment of a selected group of professors.

- Fit
- Prestige
- Other

	Journal	Average response time	Overall acceptance rate
•	Acta Analytica	3.9 months	37.50%
•	American Philosophical Quarterly	2.7 months	18.44%
•	Analysis	1.1 months	9.98%
•	Analytic Philosophy	3 months	23.08%
•	Ancient Philosophy	4.8 months	23.81%
•	Apeiron	7.7 months	40.54%
•	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie	5.5 months	7.69%
•	Australasian Journal of Philosophy	2.5 months	13.51%
•	Bioethics	3.6 months	48.15%
•	Biology and Philosophy	2.8 months	53.13%

https://apasurvey.philx.org/

- Fit
- Prestige
- Other
- Language
  - Dialogue (**CPA**, bilingual)
  - Philosophiques (SPQ)
  - Atelier de l'Éthique (bilingual)
  - Iguitur
  - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale
  - Revue Philosophique de Louvain
  - Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger
  - Other?



https://www.scimagojr.com/

## Who publishes?

